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INTRODUCTION
Words hurt—and your boss has feelings too. Criticism of a
company’s products, services, management, or labor practices is never
good for business. But when the attacker is an employee, trained and
paid to work towards the firm’s prosperity, his words can cut deeper
than the bottom line. The employer may feel betrayed and amply
justified in firing such an ‘ungrateful’ or ‘disloyal’ employee.
But this sentiment might elicit little sympathy from the single
parent who, unable to find cover the day a child is sick, wants to
speak out against a company policy of firing all absentees, or from the
long-serving employee whose co-workers are thoughtlessly fired in a
downturn. These workers feel they have a right to express their
concerns, and that the public has a right to hear them.
Both perspectives are valid. Each has a place in the nation’s labor
law. On the one hand, most employees in the United States are
employees at-will, meaning they can be fired for any reason or for
none at all,1 and courts have found a duty on the worker’s part to
refrain from harming his employer’s interests.2 An employer is not
obliged to pay unwanted or unnecessary workers. On the other hand,

1. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
2. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk
Still?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541 (2007).
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the National Labor Relations Act3 (“NLRA” or “the Act”) protects a
worker’s efforts to better her conditions of employment,4 and this
includes working against the employer’s interests by forming unions,5
organizing strikes,6 or appealing to third parties for support in a
dispute.7 An employer commits an unfair labor practice when it fires
an employee for engaging in conduct covered by the Act.8
These features of U.S. Labor Law can coexist, however uneasily.
Activity that is protected by the NLRA cannot justify a worker’s
termination; any unprotected activity can. But the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) and Federal Courts of
Appeals have recognized a third class of activity: conduct otherwise
protected by the Act may nonetheless be grounds (or “cause”)9 for
termination if it is deemed to be ‘disloyal.’10 Both the Board and the
courts have struggled to define the scope of this class, as illustrated by
a recent split between the Eighth and D.C. Circuits on the issue.11
This Note addresses the problems caused by the disloyalty
exception to section 7 of the NLRA and argues that the exception can
and should be abandoned. Part I introduces the National Labor
Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board, discusses the
Act’s conflicting policies and provisions, and presents the Supreme
Court decision that gave birth to the disloyalty exception: Jefferson
Standard.12 Part II traces the Board’s struggle to formulate an
objective test for disloyalty amenable to consistent application, and
explores criticisms of the exception as subjective, indeterminate,
outdated, and fundamentally inconsistent with the Act. Finally, Part
III argues that the true problem lies with the Board’s failure to
choose between conflicting theories of the Act’s policy in light of the
Taft-Hartley Amendments. It suggests that the Board recognizes the
difficulties inherent in the disloyalty exception but feels bound by
3. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). See
also National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. [hereinafter
NLRA
Overview],
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act

[https://perma.cc/8W7J-VX6W].
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566–67 (1978).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
9. Id. § 160.
10. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472, 474 (1953).
11. Compare DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2016), with
MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017).
12. See generally Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464.
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Jefferson Standard to retain the doctrine in some form. Part III

asserts that the Board is in fact free to create its own test and goes on
to offer an approach that would respond to both the problems with
the present doctrine and the concerns of the Jefferson Standard
Court.
I. THE NLRA, THE NLRB, AND JEFFERSON STANDARD

Part I describes labor relations in the United States prior to
passage of the NLRA. This part considers the effects on working
conditions of the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine and lays out the key
protections of the Act. Part I next explores the Supreme Court’s
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.13 and Congress’
passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, as well as the
influence of both developments on Justice Burton’s opinion for the
Court in Jefferson Standard and on subsequent interpretations of that
case.
A. Freedom of Contract and Employment At-Will
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935
the legal landscape was bleak for the American worker. Under the
dominant freedom of contract doctrine all interference in employeremployee relations was viewed, at best, as inefficient, and at worst as
a denial of each party’s God-given right to dispose of his labor or
capital as he wished.14
Freedom of contract shaped labor law in at least two ways. First, it
provided a tool with which pro-industry judges could strike down laws
passed for the common good on the grounds that they
unconstitutionally regulated agreement—most famously in Lochner v.
New York.15 Second, it served to justify the American ‘at-will’
employment regime.16 Under this system, according to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee in 1884:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause
or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty

13. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE
OBJECTIVES 87 (2009).
15. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down a New York worker-protection statute
on the grounds that it “interferes with the right of contract between the employer and
employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the
bakery of the employer”).
16. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 953–56.
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of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may
exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or
want of cause as the employer.17

But the at-will system was not as even-handed as the court implies.
While the law imposed few duties on employers, courts did find a
duty on the worker’s part to “do nothing to injure his Master’s
Business.”18 This vague duty, which has been described as “a basic
obligation of faithfulness to the master’s interests,”19 was used to
support “just cause” discharge of workers who had violated neither
the law nor the terms of their employment contracts.20 Even
contracted workers, then, could find themselves without protection
when they acted to further their own vital interests—if furthering
such interests came at the expense of the employer’s.
In an environment hostile to regulation, meanwhile, wages and
conditions were determined by the market.21 Here, employers held
the cards. Incorporation allowed consumers of labor to band together
and bargain as a unit, while labor bid down its own wages in a
scramble for work, of any kind, at any price.22 Workers who tried to
organize were fired (or worse),23 and were without recourse under the
at-will doctrine. The results were predictable: dangerous conditions,
low pay, and long hours.24 Discontent fostered unrest and, ultimately,

17. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518–19 (Tenn. 1884).
18. WILLIAM CAMPBELL, 1 FRASER ON MASTER AND SERVANT, EMPLOYER AND
WORKMAN, AND MASTER AND APPRENTICE 88 (3d ed. 1882) (italics omitted).
19. Finkin, supra note 2, at 549.
20. See, e.g., Lacy v. Osbaldiston, 8 C & P 83, 173 ER 408 (1837).
21. See generally Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National Labor Relations Act, NonParalleled Competition, and Market Power, 85 CAL. L. REV. 769 (1997) (arguing that
the corporation is a form of employer concerted activity and defending the NLRA as
necessary to correct that one-sided exercise of price-distorting market power).
22. Id.
23. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Labor Struggles, Collective Action, and Law, in
AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES AND LAW HISTORIES 1, 8 (Kenneth M. Casebeer ed.,
2d ed. 2017) (The law “authorized permanent discharge and replacement of strikers,
[and] criminal and civil conspiracy convictions [were] sustained by courts at all levels
through sweeping injunctions prohibiting labor activity . . . .”).
24. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 29 (“[I]n the early 1900s, the average
unskilled worker who earned $10 a week could barely afford a run-down, two-room
apartment without running water. By one count, industrial accidents resulted in
25,000 deaths, 25,000 permanent disability cases, and 2 million temporary disability
cases per year. If these numbers are accurate, then there were more U.S. casualties
in the workplace than on the battlefield during World War I. A 1909 government
survey revealed that 85 percent of wage earners typically worked at least fifty-four
hours per week . . . .”).
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The National Labor Relations Act

Senator Robert Wagner, author of the first version of the NLRA
(“the Wagner Act”),26 hoped by the legislation to promote industrial
peace through “industrial democracy.”27 Although the Wagner Act
pursued several different policies,28 Congress enacted the NLRA “to
protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage
collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and
management practices, which can harm the general welfare of
workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”29 Section 7 of the
NLRA, “the essence of the entire statute,”30 grants employees the
right to unionize, to strike, and to bargain collectively for mutual aid
and protection.31 Section 10(c) empowers the Board to remedy
employer action violating employees’ section 7 rights.32 That same
section, however, prohibits the Board from ordering reinstatement of
any employee terminated “for cause.”33

25. See S. REP. NO. 74-573 at 1–2 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, 2301 (1985) (“In 1933
over 812,137 workers were drawn into strikes, and in 1934 the number rose to
1,277,344. In this 2-year period over 32,000,000 working-days were lost because of
labor controversies.”).
26. See The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5Z-C89E].
27. 79 CONG. REC. S7568 (daily ed. May 15, 1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
28. See Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values,
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 230 (2005) (“The NLRA’s policies include
promoting collective bargaining; safeguarding workers’ full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing; acting for
mutual aid or protection; achieving equality of bargaining power; protecting the right
to strike; preventing business depressions; improving wage rates; increasing the
purchasing power of wage earners; and stabilizing competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.”).
29. See NLRA Overview, supra note 3.
30. Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Relations Act Was Stolen and

How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National Labor
Relations Board’s Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 16

(2012).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160.
33. Id.
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Section 3 of the Act establishes and governs the procedures of the
National Labor Relations Board.34 The Board, an independent
federal agency charged with enforcing the Act,35 determines national
labor relations policy—within the limits set by Congress.36 The Board
is composed of five members, appointed to five-year terms by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.37
The NLRB is responsible for investigating unfair labor practice
allegations, finding relevant facts, and adjudicating such complaints in
the first instance. Board orders are not self-enforcing, however, and
appeals are heard in the federal circuit with jurisdiction over the
dispute. The Board’s conclusions enjoy great deference in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals:38 from 2010 to 2015, seventy-six percent of Board
orders were enforced in full on appellate review, with eighty-five
percent enforced at least in part.39
C.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and the Taft-Hartley Amendments
of 1947

In order to understand Jefferson Standard, the case at the center of
this Note, it is important to consider two developments between the
1935 passage of the Wagner Act and the Supreme Court’s ruling in
1953.
In 1937, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.40 upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA for the first time.41
It is significant that the Court upheld the Act under Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce, on the grounds that that failure to
recognize collective bargaining rights was a chief cause of the strikes

34. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
35. Id.
36. Morris describes the Board as functioning like a “Supreme Court,” intended
to give shape to those provisions of the Act expressed in broad and flexible language.
See Morris, supra note 30, at 16.
37. Who We Are, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare [https://perma.cc/2R9T-WGFW].
38. See Wayneview Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d 341, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(finding that a reviewing court “must uphold the judgment of the Board unless, upon
reviewing the record as a whole, [it] conclude[s] that the Board’s [factual] findings are
not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Board acted arbitrarily or
otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts of the case”) (citation
omitted).
39. Appellate Court Decisions, 1974–2017, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/litigations/appellate-court-decisions1974-2016 [https://perma.cc/5X8Y-23YL].
40. 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
41. Id. at 30.
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that so often disrupted the national economy.42 One commentator
argues that the decision represents a missed opportunity: the Court’s
use of economic terminology, rather than the language of industrial
democracy, reduced Jones & Laughlin to a limited victory at best for
supporters of “worker human rights.”43 The decision made clear that
the interests at stake were commercial, not democratic.44
Ten years later, however, the 80th Congress overrode President
Truman’s veto to enact the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 194745
(“Taft-Hartley” or “the Amendments”). Taft-Hartley, in contrast to
the Wagner Act, was supported by management and sharply opposed
by organized labor.46 Labor leaders claimed that the Amendments,
which, inter alia, gave employees the right to refrain from union
membership47 and employers a right to freedom of speech,48 were a
“flagrant violation” of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.49 The Act’s defenders, on the other hand, argued that it
safeguarded the rights of both individual workers and management
against abuses by excessively powerful unions and protected the
public from strikes made possible by union employment
monopolies.50 While both supporters and opponents would agree
that Taft-Hartley was intended to limit union power as expanded by

42. Id. at 42 (“Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of
the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of
industrial peace.”). Several Legislators involved in drafting the Bill, however, had
believed that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments offered clearer paths to
constitutionality. See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the

Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–
1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2002).
43. James A. Gross, The NLRB: Then and Now, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 213,

216–17 (2011).
44. See Pope, supra note 42, at 83–85.
45. Act of June 23, 1947, PUB. L. NO. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136. The statute’s official
name is the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
46. FRED WITNEY & BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 42–43
(Prentice Hall eds., 7th ed. 1996).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
48. Id. § 158(c).
49. See Pope, supra note 42, at 109 (“AFL Secretary George Meany delivered the
administration’s response. Five months before, Meany had charged that Taft-Hartley
transgressed the Thirteenth Amendment and warned that American workers would
inevitably resist ‘such a flagrant’ violation of the Constitution.”).
50. WITNEY & TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 43.
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the Wagner Act,51 they dispute whether the Amendments changed
the statute’s underpinning policy objectives.52
Although Taft-Hartley granted new rights to individual workers
and employers, it did not repeal the Act’s substantive provisions
supporting collective bargaining.53 The conflicting policy implications
left the Court in Jefferson Standard with the task of reconciling the
pro-worker Wagner Act with the pro-management provisions of Taft
Hartley.54 Compounding the difficulty was apparent inconsistency
between, on the one hand, the rights-based language of the Wagner
Act and its legislative history, and on the other, the Court’s holding in
Jones & Laughlin that the Act merely regulated interstate
commerce.55 Such were the tensions in American labor law when the
Supreme Court confronted the problem presented in Jefferson
Standard: can an employee’s section 7 right to engage in “concerted
activities for . . . mutual aid or protection”56 be harmonized with an
employer’s section 10 right to terminate that employee “for cause?”57
D. Jefferson Standard
The labor dispute in Jefferson Standard revolved around an
arbitration provision in the employment contract between a North
Carolina broadcasting company and its twenty-two technicians.58 The
technicians, represented in negotiations by Local Union No. 1229,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“the union”),
sought renewal of the existing scheme under which all discharge
disputes were resolved through arbitration.59 The broadcaster,

51. See Morris, supra note 30, at 15 (acknowledging that Taft-Hartley pursued
“limitations on the exercise of economic power that unions were either employing or
were deemed likely to employ”).
52. See id. at 8 (blaming the revisionist efforts of organized management for
“[t]he common assertion that Taft-Hartley changed the policy of the Act”).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. See generally Morris, supra note 30.
54. See Gross, supra note 43, at 221 (“Taft-Hartley’s protection of the right to
refrain from joining a union as equal to its protection of the right to join a union to
engage in collective bargaining has resulted in a U.S. labor policy at cross-purposes
with itself.”).
55. See generally Pope, supra note 42.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
57. Id. § 160.
58. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 466–67 (1953).
59. See id. At the time, arbitration was perceived as a more worker-friendly
forum for dispute than the courts, filled with judges “terrified of class struggle, mob
rule, the anarchists and their bombs, railroad strikers, and the collapse of the social
system as they knew it.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
555 (Simon & Schuster eds., 2d ed. 1985).
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Jefferson Standard, sought to limit arbitration to determining the
relevant facts, leaving it to the company to decide whether those facts
supported the disputed discharge.60 The negotiations began in
December 1948, but talks stalled and the existing agreement expired
on January 31, 1949.61 The technicians remained with the company
and negotiations resumed in July, but by July 8 they had broken down
once more.62
On July 9, the workers began to picket the broadcaster’s station,
distributing handbills that accused the employer of unfairness and
explained the dispute over the arbitration provision.63 The handbills
named the union as the employees’ representative; the employees did
not strike, and picketed only while off-duty.64 The company did not
object to this conduct, and took no action against the employees
involved.65
Then, on August 24, the workers issued a new handbill.66 Omitted
were the earlier bill’s reference to the union and its emphasis on the
disputed arbitration clause; the new handbill instead contained “a
vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s television
broadcasts.”67 Under the heading “Is Charlotte a Second-Class
City?” the handbill suggested that Jefferson Standard did not believe
Charlotte deserved television coverage of local sports and other
events, and that the company refused to invest in equipment to
provide it.68 Workers distributed the handbills on the streets around
the station, placed them in restaurants, buses, and barbershops, and
mailed copies to local businessmen.69
The company responded, on September 3, by firing ten of the
technicians identified as having sponsored or distributed the new
handbill.70 The union complained to the NLRB, alleging that
Jefferson Standard had committed an unfair labor practice by firing
employees engaged in protected concerted activity.71 The Board
found that one of the terminated employees had played no part in the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 466–67.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 469.
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attack and therefore ordered that he be reinstated with back pay.72
The other nine employees, however, were found to have sponsored or
distributed the handbills.73 The Board ruled that the company had
committed no unfair labor practice in firing those employees and
declined to order reinstatement.74
Two strands of thought run through the Board’s opinion. First, the
Board notes that the protections afforded workers engaged in
concerted activity do not apply where the workers either pursue an
“unlawful” objective or resort to “indefensible” means.75 The
opinion argues that the attack, aimed as it was at harming the
financial interests of the company, was “hardly less ‘indefensible’ than
acts of physical sabotage.”76 Second, however, the Board emphasizes
that “the subject-matter of the employees’ verbal attack upon the
employer was not related to their interests as employees.”77 The
Board seems to suggest here that the real problem with the attack was
not necessarily the product disparagement but rather the tenuous
connection to the labor dispute and its concededly lawful purpose.78
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision of
the Board and remanded the case.79 The court’s brief opinion held
that the Board had applied the wrong criterion when it asked whether
the means used by the employees were “indefensible.”80 The proper
inquiry, according to the Court of Appeals, was the same as applied
to the employees’ ultimate objective—whether the means used were
“lawful.”81 The court remanded this question to the Board for further
findings.82
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Burton, reversed.83
Citing section 10(c) of the NLRA,84 Justice Burton asserted that
72. Jefferson Standard Broad. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1513–14 (1951).
73. Id. at 1518.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1509–10.
76. Id. at 1511.
77. Id. at 1512 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 1512 n.18. The opinion notes that although the ultimate purpose of the
attack, which was intended to extract concessions from the employer in negotiations,
was lawful, this purpose was undisclosed. Id. at 1511.
79. See Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 186,
189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
80. See id. at 188.
81. See Id. at 188–89.
82. Id. at 189.
83. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 465 (1953).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (“No order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
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“[t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee
than disloyalty to his employer,” and that “the Taft-Hartley Act seeks
to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of
service and cordial contractual relation between employer and
employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise.”85
Justice Burton quoted the view of Justice Hughes, expressed in Jones
& Laughlin, that “the Board is not entitled to make its authority a
pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is
exercised for reasons other than [employee] intimidation and
coercion.”86 Applying these reflections to the facts at hand, the Court
wrote:
Assuming that there had been no pending labor controversy, the
conduct of [the employees] from August 24 through September 3
unquestionably would have provided adequate cause for their
disciplinary discharge within the meaning of s 10(c). Their attack
related itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no
reference to wages, hours, or working conditions. The policies
attacked were those of finance and public relations for which
management, not technicians, must be responsible. The attack
asked for no public sympathy or support.87

The Court held that “[t]he fortuity of the coexistence of a labor
dispute affords these technicians no substantial defense.”88 The only
connection between the attack and the contract dispute was that the
employees hoped by the former to gain concessions in the latter.89
The Board treated the handbill not as part of the labor dispute but as
a “separable attack” on the employer’s interests, and the Court
stressed that this finding was the agency’s to make.90 Justice Burton’s
language indicates that the technicians’ conduct was unprotected
because it was not sufficiently related to the contemporaneous labor
dispute.
But the Court’s disposition of the case has been interpreted as a
holding that the employees’ criticism was unprotected, regardless of

discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended
or discharged for cause.”).
85. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472.
86. Id. at 474 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45–46
(1937)).
87. Id. at 476.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 476–77.
90. Id. at 477, 475.
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the Board’s view of the matter, because the technician resorted to
disloyal “means.”91 Justice Burton wrote:
We find no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further
specificity of findings. Even if the attack were to be treated, as the
Board has not treated it, as a concerted activity partly or wholly
within the scope of those mentioned in s 7, the means used by the
employees in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of
the protection of that section, when read in the light and context of
the purpose of the Act.92

Justice Frankfurter dissented. He made three main points: first, he
observed that the Court did not address the holding of the Court of
Appeals that the Board applied the wrong criterion by asking
whether the conduct was “indefensible” rather than “unlawful.”93
Second, the Justice stressed that section 7 protects many activities
that could be classed as disloyal, and that the criterion apparently
approved by the majority risked frustrating the whole purpose of
Act.94 Finally, Justice Frankfurter argued that the disloyalty criterion
was imprecise and would “open the door wide to individual judgment
by Board members and judges.”95
II. PAST AND PRESENT PROBLEMS WITH THE DISLOYALTY
EXCEPTION
Part II presents a recent Circuit split over the proper approach to
third party appeals under the NLRA, comparing the permissive
approach of the D.C. Circuit with the Eighth Circuit’s restrictive
reading of the NLRB’s disloyalty doctrine. Part II considers the
Board’s Mountain Shadows test as a response to sustained
disagreement and confusion over the holding of Jefferson Standard
and the factors relevant to disloyalty analysis. Finally, Part II
explores other difficulties that have troubled courts reviewing Board
interpretations of Jefferson Standard, including questions over the
proper scope of deference to the Board, the age of the NLRA, and
the suggestion of Justice Frankfurter and subsequent commentators
that every exercise of section 7 rights could be characterized as
disloyal.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 477–78.
Id.
Id. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
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A. Ongoing Confusion Over the Holding of Jefferson Standard
Justice Frankfurter’s criticisms of the disloyalty standard as
indeterminate and subjective have grown in force in the sixty-five
years since the decision. The NLRB and reviewing courts have
struggled to clarify the reach and import of Jefferson Standard.
Critics have noted confusion over the true basis for the majority’s
decision in that case; the factors relevant to the disloyalty analysis;
and the respective roles of courts, Congress, and the Board in
defining the exception.96
Two recent appellate cases show that Jefferson Standard remains
inconsistently interpreted and unpredictably applied. The courts in
DirecTV v. NLRB97 and MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB98 applied
the same test, announced in the Board’s 2000 Mountain Shadows99
decision, under which employees’ appeals to third parties are
protected where “the communication is related to an ongoing labor
dispute[(“prong 1”)] and when the communication is not so disloyal,
reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection [(“prong
2”)].”100 Prong 1 is supported by language in Jefferson Standard
explaining that the handbill was so tenuously connected to the labor
dispute as to constitute an unprotected “separable attack.” Prong 2 is
derived from Justice Burton’s reflections on disloyalty and from the
Court’s ambiguous words of disposition. Because Jefferson Standard
could have been decided on either ground, it is not clear whether
satisfaction of either Mountain Shadows prong is a necessary or
sufficient condition of protection. This ambiguity is at the heart of
the present split, in which the Eighth and D.C. Circuits applied the
Board’s test very differently.
B.

DirecTV v. NLRB

In DirecTV v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Board order
resting on a narrow reading of the disloyalty exception as
implemented by the Mountain Shadows test.101 The case arose out of
a dispute between a hardware company and its engineers.102 At issue
was the company’s compensation policy, which penalized salesmen
96. See infra Sections II.D–F.
97. 837 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
98. 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017).
99. Am. Golf Corp. (Mountain Shadows), 330 N.L.R.B. 1238 (2000).
100. Id. at 1240 (emphasis in original).
101. DirecTV v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2016), enforcing MasTec
Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. 103 (2011).
102. Id. at 28–30.

2018]

BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS

775

who failed to convince customers to install a phone line with their
television.103 The employees appeared on local television to air their
grievances.104 During their segment, however, the employees not
only complained of the unfairness of the policy itself but further
alleged that the company had responded to their internal complaints
by encouraging them to lie to customers by telling them their
receivers would blow up if they failed to install the extra line.105 After
the company terminated the technicians, the Board ordered
reinstatement.106
Although the opinion of the D.C. Circuit is complicated by the
inaccuracy of the employees’ allegations,107 two key points are clear.
First, the court upheld the Board’s view that, because the employees
had referred in the segment to the ongoing pay dispute, they could be
terminated only if their conduct was “flagrantly disloyal, wholly
incommensurate with any grievances which [the employees] might
have.”108 The court did not examine the Board’s finding that “the
employee communications here were clearly related to the labor
dispute,”109 but ruled that to manifest such a connection entitles
employees to a certain degree of immunity from discharge.
The second question presented in DirecTV was whether the Board
was permitted to consider subjective intent in determining which
conduct merits elevation to the status of ‘flagrant disloyalty.’110
Acknowledging its 1992 holding in George A. Hormel & Co. v.
NLRB111 that a subjective test for disloyalty risked frustrating the
NLRA’s purpose of retaining the employer’s right to discharge
disloyal employees,112 the court nevertheless upheld the Board’s

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 28–31.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Id. at 29 (“Some of the advice plainly was not meant to be taken literally, such
as when a MasTec manager jokingly told technicians they should tell customers the
DirecTV system would ‘blow up’ without a phone connection.”).
108. Id. at 36 (quoting MasTec Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. 103, 108 (2011)).
109. Id. at 35.
110. Id. at 32.
111. 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also discussion infra Section II.D.3.
112. Id. at 1065 (“Yet under the Board’s subjective test, the employer could not
lawfully discharge him without showing also [ . . . ] that the employee’s
conduct . . . was . . . motivated . . . to actually encourage or support a boycott.’
Because extending protection to such conduct would so circumscribe as to defeat the
employer’s right to discharge an employee who is working against the employer’s
business interest, we conclude that a subjective test is inconsistent with the Act.
Rather, the Act requires an objective test of disloyalty.”).
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approach.113 The court reasoned that Hormel barred a subjective test
for the presence of disloyalty, not for the degree of any disloyalty
chargeable to the employee, and held that in analyzing the latter the
Board was entitled to consider subjective intent.114
Judge Brown dissented—vigorously.115 She disagreed with the
majority on both points, asserting that the case “demonstrates the
lengths to which the Board will go to contort an even-handed Act into
an anti-employer manifesto. Instead of attempting to balance
conflicting interests, the NLRB reacts like a pinball machine stuck on
tilt, reflexively ensuring employers always lose a turn.”116 Judge
Brown maintained that Jefferson Standard did not require employers
to show employees’ flagrant disloyalty.117 Rather, employees’ appeals
to third parties lose the Act’s protection when they either fail to refer
to a labor dispute or are “disloyal,” as defined by Jefferson Standard
and its progeny.118 The majority was wrong, therefore, to immunize
all conduct falling below its heightened standard.119
Judge Brown also differed from the majority on the relevance of
employee motive or intent to the disloyalty analysis. The judge
argued that circuit precedent demanded an objective test: to show
disloyalty or the heightened flagrant disloyalty, an employer would be
required to prove his employee’s state of mind to fire him, which was
a burden the court had previously held to be an unreasonable
interpretation of the Act.120
C.

MikLin v. NLRB

According to the majority in DirecTV, the Board had not required
the employer to show the presence of malicious intent in third party
appeals. Instead, the D.C. Circuit merely weighed the absence of
such motivation as one factor.121 In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v.

113. DirecTV, 873 F.3d at 28.
114. Id. at 39–40.
115. Id. at 46 (Brown, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 47.
117. Id. at 52–53.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 53–54.
120. Id. at 48–49.
121. See id. at 37–38 (majority opinion) (rebutting charges of “an inconsistency
with Hormel in the Board’s noting (as one consideration) the lack of evidence that
the employees participated in the newscast with the intention to cause subscribers to
cancel their service rather than the intention to gain public support in the pay
dispute”). MasTec, who provided installation services to DirecTV, petitioned for
certiorari to the Supreme Court on the subjective intent issue. MasTec Advanced
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NLRB, however, the Eighth Circuit confronted a Board decision that
did treat intent as dispositive: ordering reinstatement of sandwich

shop employees because the employer was unable to prove that their
public criticisms were maliciously motivated.122 The Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, declined to enforce the order, holding that by
requiring proof of malicious intent the Board “has not interpreted
Jefferson Standard—it has overruled it.”123
In MikLin, the employees of a Jimmy John’s sandwich shop were
engaged in a dispute over the employer’s sick leave policy, which
barred workers from calling in sick without finding their own
replacement.124 During flu season, the employees put posters up
around the shop suggesting to customers that the workers who made
their sandwiches could be sick and infectious.125 Small print at the
bottom of the poster made reference to the labor dispute and directed
readers to the union website.126
When the store manager took down the posters, the employees
sent copies to more than one hundred media outlets, along with a
letter and a press release to similar effect.127 The dispute was not
resolved, and the employees persevered, issuing a new poster that
substituted the company vice-president’s name and personal contact
information for the previous language that referred to the dispute.128
The vice-president was “bombarded” with phone calls from
customers concerned about the safety of eating at Jimmy Johns.129
Techs. v. NLRB, 138 S. Ct. 138 (Oct. 2, 2017) (denying certiorari). The petition was
denied, id., perhaps because (1) the D.C. Circuit did not interpret the Board’s
opinion as giving dispositive weight to subjective intent, and (2) several courts have
acknowledged the relevance of subjective intent as one factor of the analysis. See,
e.g., MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017).
122. MikLin Enters., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Aug. 21, 2014)).
123. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 815.
124. Id. at 817.
125. Id. at 815–16 (“[The posters] prominently featured two identical images of a
Jimmy John’s sandwich.
Above the first image were the words, ‘YOUR
SANDWICH MADE BY A HEALTHY JIMMY JOHN’S WORKER.’ The text
above the second image said, ‘YOUR SANDWICH MADE BY A SICK JIMMY
JOHN’S WORKER.’ ‘HEALTHY’ and ‘SICK’ were in red letters, larger than the
surrounding text in white. Below the pictures, white text asked: ‘CAN’T TELL THE
DIFFERENCE?’ The response, in red and slightly smaller: ‘THAT’S TOO BAD
BECAUSE JIMMY JOHN’S WORKERS DON’T GET PAID SICK DAYS.
SHOOT, WE CAN’T EVEN CALL IN SICK.’ Below, in slightly smaller text, was
the warning, ‘WE HOPE YOUR IMMUNE SYSTEM IS READY BECAUSE
YOU’RE ABOUT TO TAKE THE SANDWICH TEST.’”).
126. Id. at 816.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 817.
129. Id.
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When the employer ultimately fired six of the organizing employees,
the Board ordered reinstatement.130
Vacating the Board’s order, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected
the approach of the DirectTV majority.131 The Eighth Circuit’s
reading of Jefferson Standard mirrors that of Judge Brown: reference
to a labor dispute is no more than a threshold condition of section 7
protection. Conduct must independently satisfy the disloyalty prong,
meaning, at a minimum, that conduct as disloyal as that of the
Jefferson Standard technicians is unprotected.132 The court also held
that the Board’s test, by requiring malicious intent, would
impermissibly restrict the employer’s right to terminate.133
The dissent argued that Jefferson Standard was decided on the
grounds that the handbill was insufficiently related to the dispute, and
that the language read as requiring a disloyalty exception “cannot be
binding here.”134 Moreover, the dissent maintained, the malicious
motive requirement was the Board’s own creation, and not an
interpretation of Jefferson Standard.135 As such, it was entitled to
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.136
It is clear that two courts applying the Board’s Mountain Shadows
test can take very different approaches while both claiming to view
the test through the lens of Jefferson Standard. History has borne out
Justice Frankfurter’s warning that the majority’s opinion would offer
little guidance to future courts and Board panels. No party in either
case objected to the test itself, which appears designed to
accommodate the doctrinal diversity of its predecessors.137
D.

Confusion over the Factors Relevant to Disloyalty Analysis

The problems with the disloyalty doctrine go beyond the structural
ambiguities of the Mountain Shadows test. As Justice Frankfurter
130. Id. at 818 (referencing the NLRB’s previous order of restatement in MikLin
Enters., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Aug. 21, 2014)).
131. Id. at 820 n.1 (stating that “we disagree with the contrary conclusion of the
panel majority in [DirecTV]”).
132. Id. at 820.
133. Id. at 822.
134. Id. at 832 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(holding that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute”).
137. See infra Sections II.D.1–3.
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noted in Jefferson Standard, ‘loyalty’ is an imprecise term and is hard
to define objectively. The dispute over the role of intent is just the
latest confusion over the factors relevant to the presence, or severity,
of ‘disloyalty.’
Professor Melinda Branscomb writes that the
Jefferson Standard Court “created this imprecision” when it “used
product disparagement and disloyalty almost interchangeably, giving
no guidance on the factors relevant to each.”138 One commentator
suggests the term “disloyalty” is no more than a “catchphrase,”
without definite content, used in place of rigorous analysis.139

1.

Early Interpretations of Jefferson Standard

Jefferson Standard was at first interpreted as equating disloyalty

with public disparagement of an employer’s product.140 Later cases,
however, made clear that not all disparagement was unprotected.141
Courts began to focus on the relationship between any disparagement
and an ongoing labor dispute, with one prominent approach asking
whether the criticism “appeared necessary to effectuate the
employees’ lawful aims.”142 Other factors deemed relevant to the
analysis in some courts included the tone of the criticism,143 the
tendency of the criticism to harm the employer,144 and the apparent
motive of the workers.145 The variety of factors eligible for
consideration and the lack of any guiding principle in weighing them

138. Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U.
L. REV. 291, 322 (1993).
139. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 563.
140. Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1627–28 (1956) (discharging
striking employees, who distributed handbills claiming that paint made by
replacement workers was unsafe, was justified by disloyal product disparagement).
141. See Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.
1976) (protecting nurse’s televised claims that salary dispute compromised patient
care because they were “directly related to protected concerted activities”); Allied
Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229 (1980) (holding that airline mechanic’s letter to
airport manager linking lack of established operating procedures or training
programs with risk of “tragedy” at Auto/Gas site was protected despite inflammatory
language because directly connected to labor dispute).
142. NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640–41 (1st Cir. 1982)
(determining that nurse’s public criticism of hospital staffing procedures, expressed in
letter to newspaper editor, was protected because he had first tried to raise the
concern directly with management and because “criticism of the Hospital’s
administration was intertwined inextricably with working conditions”).
143. See generally Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.
1980).
144. See generally NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972).
145. See Richboro Cmty. Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268
(1979).
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against each other produced confusing, apparently conflicting
outcomes146 that did not, Professor Branscomb notes, “turn
consistently on loyalty or its absence.”147

2.

The Ninth Circuit Shifts Focus to the “Connection” Inquiry that
Would Become Prong 1 of the Mountain Shadows Test

In Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB148 the Ninth Circuit tried to
gather in the many loose strands of the disloyalty analysis, declaring
that each may do some work in distinguishing protected from
unprotected criticism.149 The case involved a dispute between a
newspaper and its employees, whose union wrote to the paper’s
advertisers noting the disruptive effect of the disagreement on
circulation and profits and urging them to encourage the paper to
reach a settlement.150 The court noted, first, that the appeal’s
connection to an ongoing labor dispute was the most important factor
to consider in determining whether it was unprotected disloyalty or
protected concerted activity.151 Second, the court stated that all thirdparty appeals were to be evaluated in their whole context, and that
although factors such as tone, motive, and harm were all relevant,
none was dispositive: “[i]n summary, the disloyalty standard is at base
a question of whether the employees’ efforts to improve their wages
or working conditions through influencing strangers to the labor
dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances.”152 The court held that the letter to the advertisers
was protected despite disparaging the paper’s product—which, from

146. Compare Golden Day Sch., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1292, 1292 (1978) (deciding
that day care center engaged in unfair labor practice by firing employees who
distributed, to parents of children in the center’s care, a leaflet alleging the center was
unsafe and unsanitary, discriminated against disabled children and those funded by
the county, falsified evaluations, and lied to parents), with Red Top, 455 F.2d at 721
(declining to protect employee’s threat to complain directly to customers about
working conditions because it was calculated to harm employer’s business interests).
147. Branscomb, supra note 138, at 328.
148. See generally Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989).
149. See id. at 217.
150. Id. at 214.
151. Id. at 217. The court explained that:
Such a focus is appropriate. If unions are not permitted to address matters
that are of direct interest to third parties in addition to complaining about
their own working conditions, it is unlikely that workers’ undisputed right to
make third party appeals in pursuit of better working conditions would be
anything but an empty provision.

Id.

152. Id. at 220.
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the advertiser’s point of view, was circulation—because it was related
to the dispute, its tone was “constructive and hopeful,” and because,
in the absence of malicious intent, any harm to the employer’s
business interests was reasonable under the circumstances.153

3. The D.C. Circuit Breathes New Life into the “Disloyalty”
Inquiry that Would Become Prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows Test
Three years after Sierra Publishing, however, in George A. Hormel
& Co. v. NLRB,154 the D.C. Circuit appeared to hold that “working
against the employer’s business interest” was in fact sufficient to
constitute disloyalty forfeiting protection of the Act—however close
the connection between the criticism and the labor dispute.155 In
Hormel, the court applied the rule that a third party appeal—here,
public support for a boycott of the employer’s products—is protected
only where it: “(1) is related to an ongoing labor dispute and (2) does
not disparage the employer’s product.”156 The Board’s requirement
that the employer prove malicious intent, the court held, “would so
circumscribe as to defeat the employer’s right to discharge an
employee who is working against the employer’s business
interests.”157 The test was therefore inconsistent with the D.C.
Circuit’s interpretation of the NLRA in light of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. The court not only assumed that Jefferson Standard
precluded product disparagement, but held further that the decision
requires the Board to consider the objective tendency of employee
conduct to work against the employer’s business interest in
determining disloyalty.158

153. Id.
154. See generally George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (declining to enforce Board reinstatement order that impermissibly required
employer to prove malicious intent and finding company justly discharged worker for
rally appearance supporting a boycott of the employer’s product, whether the worker
intended harm or not).
155. Id. at 1065.
156. Id. at 1064 (citing Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir.
1989)).
157. Id. at 1065.
158. Id.
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The Disloyalty Exception Is Inconsistent with NLRA Provisions
that Expressly Protect Strikes, Boycotts, and Other
Concerted Activity

The Mountain Shadows test applied in MikLin and DirecTV
appears designed to accommodate the conflicting approaches of the
Sierra Publishing and Hormel courts. Both the connection to the
labor dispute and the detriment to the employer play a part. But the
present split shows the flaw in this approach: as Justice Frankfurter
warned in 1953, disloyalty and concerted action are “like two halves
of a pair of shears.”159
Third-party appeals divide panels so deeply because they
“effectuate the employees’ lawful aims”160 only insofar as the
employees “bite the hand that feeds [them].”161 Any test for
protection that seeks to balance the appeal’s value to employees
against its threatened harm to employers risks excluding the most
effective criticisms, protecting the employer from all but the most
toothless charges. The ‘disloyalty exception’ reading of Jefferson
Standard is fundamentally inconsistent with the NLRA’s express
protections because every exercise of section 7 rights can be viewed as
disloyal—and the greater the prejudice to the employer, the more
effectively the activity works towards the employees’ “mutual aid or
protection.”162
F.

Courts Disagree over the Source and Status of the Disloyalty
Exception and the Proper Scope of Deference to the Board

A further problem with disloyalty analysis is disagreement over the
proper scope of judicial deference to Board decisions. Professor
Branscomb argues that “principles of administrative law ought to lend
some measure of stability” to the doctrine, but that the emotional and
political implications of the concept tempt judges improperly to revise
Board determinations.163 In fact, the back-and-forth between the

159. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 480 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
160. NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640 (1st Cir. 1981).
161. NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE 183
(Theodore St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005) (citing Forest City Publ’g Co., 58 LA 773,
783 (1972) (McCoy, Arb.)).
162. See Branscomb, supra note 138, at 336 (noting that the Act expressly permits
two forms of activity—strikes and lockouts—”that are only successful when they
cause or threaten economic harm”; that the Act “requires employees to act out of
self-interest”; and that “section 7 rights are especially important in situations when
the interests of management and labor are most antagonistic” (emphasis in original)).
163. Id. at 340.
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MikLin majority and dissent paints a deference picture clouded by

more than judicial inconsistency: confusion over the basis for the
holding leaves it unclear when the Board can be seen as applying its
own test and when it is interpreting Jefferson Standard.164 And if the
Board is interpreting Supreme Court precedent that purportedly
construed the unambiguous provisions of a statute, the Supreme
Court’s BrandX165 decision may require greater Board autonomy.166
A further complication arises with the suggestion that section 10(c),
under Jefferson Standard, receives its content from the common law
of ‘master’ and ‘servant.’167 This view implies a greater role for the
judiciary in defining disloyalty, with the paradoxical result of a Boarddefined rule and a court-defined exception.
G. The Disloyalty Exception Is Out of Date
Finally, several commentators have maintained that the disloyalty
exception, and the NLRA itself, are outdated. The character of this
charge depends on the critic’s understanding of the Act and its
provisions: Professor Matthew Finkin argues from changed values,
contending that we should re-examine the ‘disloyalty’ exception in
light of modern recognition that much employee criticism serves the
public interest.168 Several writers argue the NLRA and the disloyalty
exception are ill-equipped to handle modern ‘corporate campaigns,’
which “seek to equalize the bargaining power between labor and
management through viral action directed at altering consumer
perception of a company’s image.”169 And Professor Cynthia Estlund
argues that labor law’s fundamental principles and implementing
strategies “have been nearly frozen, or ossified, for over fifty
years.”170

164. MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 816 F.3d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 2017).
165. Nat’l Cable & Tel. Ass’n v. BrandX Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(“[Prior appellate court] construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
room for agency discretion.”).
166. MikLin, 816 F.3d at 7.
167. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 548.
168. See generally id.
169. Geordan G. Logan, Social Media Policy Confusion: The NLRB’s Dated

Embrace of Concerted Activity Misconstrues the Realities of Twenty-First Century
Collective Action, 15 NEV. L.J. 354, 356 (2015). See generally Branscomb, supra note

138.
170. Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1530 (2002).
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF JEFFERSON STANDARD
This part argues that the true flaw in the Board’s disloyalty
doctrine, as implemented through the Mountain Shadows test, is that
decision-makers remain free to apply their own conceptions of the
NLRA’s fundamental purpose.
The result is an unstable,
unpredictable, and politicized approach to third party appeals. Part
III aims to show that, because Jefferson Standard need not be
interpreted as creating a disloyalty exception to NLRA section 7, the
Board is free to craft its own approach to employees’ public criticisms
of employers. A new test must, however, respond to the Jefferson
Standard Court’s concern that an overprotective rule could proscribe
termination even for conduct separable from legitimate concerted
activity arising out of an ongoing labor dispute. This part suggests
that the Board should focus on the connection between the content of
the criticism and the employees’ goals in the labor dispute in
distinguishing protected from unprotected third party appeals.
A. The Mountain Shadows Test Fails to Choose Between
Competing Visions of NLRA Policy
Although the charges of indeterminacy, subjectivity, and judicial
overreach have some force, these problems are far from unique to the
disloyalty exception and the Mountain Shadows test. Any test will to
some extent call on judges to engage in difficult line-drawing and
definitional exercises, and even the most flexible statutes age from the
moment the Presidential ink is dry. In some matters, “it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right.”171
But not in all matters. The problems surrounding disloyalty
doctrine are symptomatic of deeper issues with the NLRA, and these
suffice to justify reexamination of at least the constraint that “imposes
the most crippling limitations”172 on workplace collective action.
The fundamental problem with the disloyalty exception, as applied
by courts today, is its failure to choose between competing
understandings of the Act’s purpose. Instead of crafting a rule that
reliably separates constructive from destructive criticism, the
Mountain Shadows test asks panels to balance two opposing but
equal, indeed positively correlated, interests while supplying no

171. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
172. Marion Crane & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
1791, 1839 (2015).
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connection to a broader policy or ultimate objective. Judges who
believe Congress intended the Board to further the Act’s purposes in
the role of “neutral guarantor”173 of each party’s rights will view
third-party appeals that aim only to injure the employer financially as
a tactic so one-sided as to be incompatible with that policy. These
judges stress prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows test and focus on
‘disloyalty.’ If, as other judges believe, Congress intended the Board
to promote collective bargaining in the face of the inevitable efforts of
organized management to defeat it, then there is no reason the
employer’s interests should prevail where the employees’ conduct is
lawful and has “some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees.”174 These judges emphasize prong 1 of Mountain
Shadows and will protect any conduct sufficiently related to the labor
dispute to be viewed as part of its anticipated “rough-and-tumble.”175
The Board’s aim is to separate third party appeals that are
desirable, in light of the Act’s underlying goals, from those that are
not. Under the prevailing understanding of Jefferson Standard,
section 10(c) protects a “right” of the employer—to terminate
employees for cause—that must be balanced against the right of the
employee to engage in concerted activity. But because the same
activity will implicate both rights, the test really asks each decisionmaker to apply his own view of the NLRA’s purpose. In practice, the
disloyalty exception functions like a “minefield”176—both employer
and employee are punished for the slightest misstep; such care is
required that some dare not tread the collective action path at all.
B.

The Differing Views on the Role of Disloyalty Doctrine Reflect
Wider Disagreement over the Act’s Purpose in Light of the
Taft-Hartley Amendments

The disloyalty difficulty mirrors a broader problem with the
National Labor Relations Act.
Taft-Hartley gave rise to “a
controversy never before known to follow the passage of a single
labor law,”177 as politicians, legal scholars, journalists, and
representatives of labor and employer interests debated the
Amendments’ meaning and effect.178 Even seventy years ago,
173. Gross, supra note 43, at 222.
174. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
175. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 480 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
176. Branscomb, supra note 138, at 295.
177. WHITNEY & TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 42.
178. Id. (“Literally hundreds of articles and tracts have been written on the law.
By December 1, 1949, the National Labor Relations Board reported a bibliography
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commentators understood that the effect of the Act turned largely on
this question: did the pro-employer provisions signal a fundamental
shift in the Act’s purpose, or did Congress’ decision to retain the core
employee rights indicate that the changes were merely marginal
policy adjustments?179 As one commentator reminds us, “the
legitimacy of Board determinations is dependent on their conformity
to statutory policy.”180
Professor James Gross argues that Taft-Hartley provisions
protecting individual rights have been “read as statutory justification
for” a policy of employer resistance to collective bargaining and for a
concept of the government’s role as “neutral guarantor” of both
parties’ rights in a labor dispute.181 Gross argues that this is
inconsistent with the Act’s initial policy of promoting collective
bargaining to correct the power imbalance inherent in the essentially
unregulated at-will regime, and that spurious ambiguity allows
decision-makers to “choose between these contradictory statutory
policies and still claim that they are conforming to congressional
intent.”182 Just as some forms of interference with union organization
were recast as a defense of the individual employee’s right to bargain
for himself, so interference with employee’s section 7 rights can be
justified as protection of the employer’s rights under section 10(c).
The aim in designing rules to implement a statutory purpose183 is to
set a standard that limits decision-maker discretion and generates
predictable results.184 But because the Mountain Shadows test
accomplishes neither goal, its results are most reliably predicted by
Political
the political majority of the tribunal applying it.185
inclinations play a legitimate role in agency interpretation,
rulemaking, and adjudication, and this is particularly true of the

on the legislation that included about 300 items. By no means did the list include all
the material written or presented in speeches on the legislation.”).
179. See generally Morris, supra note 30.
180. Lee Modjeska, In Defense of the NLRB, 33 MERCER L. REV. 851, 855 (1982).
181. Gross, supra note 43, at 222.
182. Id.
183. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“[An agency’s] function
of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible,
through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”).
184. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, in
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PROPERTY RIGHT ECONOMICS 125, 131 (Enrico
Colombatto ed., 2003) (“[T]he degree to which the society is bound by law, is
committed to processes that allow property rights to be secure under legal rules that
will be applied predictably and not subject to the whims of particular individuals,
matters. The commitment to such processes is the essence of the rule of law.”).
185. See supra Section II.D.
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NLRB.
The NLRA is a broadly-written statute, and can
accommodate diversity and evolution of political opinion on certain
issues. But the failure to develop a purpose-built test works
particular mischief here, where: (1) the standard devised relies on so
subjective and value-laden a concept as ‘disloyalty’; (2) there is no
helpful statutory or judicial definition on which to draw;186 (3) it is not
clear how ‘disloyalty’ implicates the Board’s expertise in labor
relations;187 and (4) judges, unclear about whether they are
interpreting Supreme Court precedent, an agency interpretation of
that precedent, an agency interpretation of the Act, or the NLRA
itself, are tempted to substitute their judgment for the Board’s.188
Politics drives inconsistent outcomes, both across and within U.S.
Courts of Appeals, as illustrated by the vacillations of the D.C.
Circuit: Republican-appointed majorities handed down pro-employer
decisions in Hormel (1992)189 and Endicott (2006),190 before the
Democrat-appointed panel majority changed course in DirecTV
(2016),191 limiting the reach of the earlier holdings. In MikLin,
meanwhile, the court’s two Democrat-appointed judges were alone in
their pro-employee dissent, while the vast Republican-appointed
majority signed the court’s en banc ruling for the employer.
A significant revision in Board policy can be anticipated. President
Trump’s latest appointees192 create the Board’s first Republican

186. See Finkin, supra note 2.
187. See generally Benjamin L. Ristau, Dysfunctional Disloyalty Standards in
Employee Criticism Cases, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 913 (2013).
188. See, e.g., supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
189. See generally George A. Hormel v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (1992) (before D.H.
Ginsburg, Sentelle, & Henderson, Circuit JJ.); United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Judges],
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_District_of_Colum
bia_Circuit [https://perma.cc/5CSB-Z22X] (noting the appointing President of each of
the Article III and senior judges on the D.C. Circuit).
190. See generally Endicott Int’l Techs., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (reversing a Board’s reinstatement order on the grounds that it failed to
consider whether the employees’ conduct was disloyal) (before Henderson, Rogers,
& Griffith, Circuit JJ.); D.C. Circuit Judges, supra note 189.
191. See generally DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, (D.C. Cir. 2016) (before
Rogers, Brown, & Srinivasan, Circuit JJ.); D.C. Circuit Judges, supra note 189; Janice
Rogers Brown, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Janice_Rogers_Brown
[https://perma.cc/84UT-3D82].
192. These include William Emanuel, formerly a partner at Littler Mendelson, a
leading management-side labor and employment firm, and Marvin Kaplan, formerly
Chief Counsel of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, where he
was an outspoken critic of the Board’s perceived pro-union stance. See Sean Higgins,
Senate Confirms Marvin Kaplan for NLRB, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-confirms-marvin-kaplan-for-nlrb/
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majority in almost ten years.193 Moreover, these appointees are the
same sort of “management attorneys” who would, Senator
Humphreys predicted in 1953, “interpret[ ] out of existence” the
rights protected by the Act.194 Although the NLRB implements
policy by adjudication rather than rulemaking, it should still aim to
resolve disputes in a manner that provides “guidance for future
cases.”195 This requires “explicitly identifying the objectives and
models”196 of the Act’s regulation of labor relations.
C.

The Debate over Whether Taft-Hartley Changed NLRA Policy
Is Misguided

Whatever the vision of Senator Wagner or the aspirations of
commentators then and now, the NLRA is not a human rights
statute197 and is not designed to guarantee any specific working
conditions beyond the collective bargaining process.198 But nor is the
Act indifferent to the balance of power between the parties or the
means used in negotiations. As even Gross concedes, the Wagner
Act was upheld as a strike-prevention measure199 intended to avert
“the paralyzing consequences of industrial war”200: interference with
the flow of interstate commerce. The debate over whether Congress

article/2630466 [https://perma.cc/M2EQ-UGZZ]; Lydia Wheeler, Senate Confirms
Second Trump Nominee to Labor Board, THE HILL (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://thehill.com/regulation/administration/352345-senate-confirms-second-trumpnominee-to-labor-board [https://perma.cc/EM44-4Q39].
193. Todd Lebowitz, NLRB Shifts to Republican Majority; Change in Joint
Employment Doctrine is Likely, WHO IS MY EMP.? (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://whoismyemployee.com/2017/10/09/nlrb-shifts-to-republican-majority-changein-joint-employment-doctrine-is-likely/ [https://perma.cc/DU2E-P6V2].
194. Humphrey Charges ‘Packing’ of N.L.R.B., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1953, at L25,
https://www.nytimes.com/1953/10/06/archives/humphrey-charges-packing-ofnlrb.html [https://nyti.ms/2DgwvBx].
195. See generally Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 481 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority opinion in part because “[t]he
Board and the courts of appeals will hardly find guidance for future cases from this
Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals, beyond that which the specific facts of this
case may afford.” Id.
196. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 22.
197. Even James Gross, who argues that the Act should have been interpreted as a
human rights statute, acknowledges that his view represents the road not taken. See
generally Gross, supra note 43.
198. These goals are pursued by other labor laws, for example the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
199. See Gross, supra note 43, at 217 (noting that the Board’s arguments in Jones
& Laughlin defended an Act that “could have been titled the ‘Wagner Anti-Strike
Law’”).
200. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).
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intended the Board to promote collective bargaining or to serve only
as impartial referee is misguided because it loses sight of this ultimate
purpose.
The extent to which the Board supports collective
bargaining in any given area must be determined by the Act’s
fundamental objectivenot the reverse.
Although the Act pursues its purpose through several intermediate
policies, its provisions are better seen as tools than goals, as means to
its ultimate end of industrial peace.201 Taft-Hartley consists of
provisions designed to prevent abuses of Wagner Act policies that fail
to promote, and may undermine, the Act’s ultimate purposes of
industrial peace, free-flowing interstate commerce, and economic
prosperity.202 In formulating rules that best effectuate the purposes
of the Act, the Board should aim to protect criticism that furthers the
sustainable, peaceful resolution of a labor dispute, and to discourage
criticism that does not. Several considerations might be relevant: is
the criticism confined to attacks on the actual labor policies of the
company, or does it attack the employer in general? Is the criticism
one the employee could bring to the employer itself? Would the
harm caused by the attack survive resolution of the labor dispute?
But ‘disloyalty’ is an unsuitable criterion. It may exclude desirable
criticisms, which can further a discussion, release deep-running
tensions, prevent strikes, and raise productivity by providing useful
input from employees. Conversely, the Board’s present test may
protect attacks which, because they attack the employer on an
independent ground, can only broaden disagreement and disrupt
productive activity. Such criticism will often have no compensatory
beneficial effect, addressing things beyond the employer’s control,
things the employer has plans to address in time, or criticism
addressing no specific practice of the employer but aiming only to
work reputational and commercial harm. Although section 7 does
not protect all workers who threaten economic harm to their
employer, limitations on that section’s scope should be tailored to fit
within a larger, purpose-built plan. The disloyalty exception is
instead one of “numerous gaps built on conflicting premises with no
clear objectives.”203

201. See NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Emps. of Am. Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986)
(“The basic purpose of the . . . Act is to preserve industrial peace.”).
202. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (providing that the assurance of the rights guaranteed by
the Act requires elimination of certain “concerted activities which impair the interest
of the public in the free flow of [interstate] commerce”).
203. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 195.
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D. The Board Is Free to Abandon the Disloyalty Exception
As Judge Brown pointed out in her dissent in DirecTV, the Board
has progressively narrowed the scope of the disloyalty exception.204
First, it required “flagrant” disloyalty; next, it considered lack of
intent as counting against disloyalty; finally, the Board refused to find
unprotected disloyalty without proof of malicious intent. But so long
as the Board views Jefferson Standard as enshrining an employer’s
right in some cases to terminate disloyal employees, including those
engaged in otherwise protected concerted activity, it will struggle to
contain the reach of the exception.205
Jefferson Standard need not be read as creating a disloyalty
exception, or an exception of any kind,206 to the NLRA’s protections.
Although the question before the court was whether the Board erred
in excluding “indefensible” conduct from the Act’s protections, as
opposed to the narrower “unlawful” formulation, the Supreme
Court—as stressed by Justice Frankfurter in dissent207—never
reached that issue. The Court emphasized throughout its opinion the
Board’s finding that the handbill was “a concerted separable attack,”
which “was not part of an appeal for support in the pending
dispute.”208 The opinion notes the importance of Board fact-finding
in distinguishing genuine concerted activity from contemporaneous,
apparently similar, but unprotected conduct.209 The bulk of the
Court’s decision addresses the tenuous connection to the dispute, and

204. See DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (observing that, since Jefferson Standard, the Board has “gradually
weakened the very right the Court went out of its way to vindicate”).
205. In both MikLin Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) and
George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the court seized
on prong 2 of the Mountain Shadows test to deny employees the protection of the
Act. See supra Sections II.C, II.D.3.
206. The Supreme Court has apparently recognized the problems arising from the
call of concerted, yet unprotected, activity. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370
U.S. 9, 16–17 (1962) (“[Section 10(c)], of course, cannot mean that an employer is at
liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted activities which
[section] 7 of the Act protects.”).
207. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 479 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“On
this central issue—whether the Court of Appeals rightly or wrongly found that the
Board applied an improper criterion—this Court is silent. It does not support the
Board in using ‘indefensible’ as the legal litmus nor does it reject the Court of
Appeals’ rejection of that test. This Court presumably does not disagree with the
assumption of the Court of Appeals that conduct may be ‘indefensible’ in the
colloquial meaning of that loose adjective, and yet be within the protection of
[section] 7.”).
208. Id. at 477.
209. Id. at 474–75.
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the Court offered no test for disloyalty to which future panels could
refer.
Moreover, the Court’s decision not to remand to the Board, often
interpreted as giving binding effect to the Court’s disloyalty dicta,210
just as credibly suggests the reverse. The reason the majority “found
no occasion” to remand to the Board was not necessarily, or even
plausibly, the Court’s silent application of a newly-devised, undefined
disloyalty standard. Instead, the most likely explanation is that the
Board’s own factual conclusion that the attack was “separable” from
the dispute compelled the result that it was unprotected. Whether the
standard for losing protection is ‘unlawfulness,’ ‘indefensibility,’ or
‘disloyalty,’ the Board could not order reinstatement of an employee
fired for activity that was never within the scope of section 7.
Alternatively, the Court’s talk of remanding may be otherwise
explicable: the Court may have viewed as immaterial the Board’s
decision on whether third-party appeals were protected at all.211 The
important point is that the decision not to remand does not have to be
read as a binding holding on disloyalty.
On this reading, Jefferson Standard held that where an appeal is
not sufficiently connected to the dispute such that it is within the
Act’s protection, the workers responsible remain at-will employees
subject to discharge “for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause.”212 One must not forget that, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, “an American employer in 1950 had the absolute right to
discharge an employee for any reason.”213 Although the concept of
“disloyalty” did play a major role in the Court’s decision, at-will
employees can be fired for no reason. The significance of the
technicians’ ‘disloyalty’ stems from the nature of these cases: because

210. See, e.g., MikLin, 861 F.3d at 820 (“The Supreme Court’s decision not to
remand in Jefferson Standard made clear that the Court’s disloyalty ruling includes
communications that otherwise would fall within section 7 protection, if those
communications ‘mak[e] a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the
company’s product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to
harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income.’” (quoting Jefferson Standard,
346 U.S. at 471)).
211. The issue of whether third-party appeals were protected at all was not settled
until twenty-five years later. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978)
(finding employees do not lose section 7 protection “when they seek to improve
terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship”).
212. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884).
213. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 377 (2002) (emphasis
added).
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they arise during labor disputes, the employer claiming that a
termination was ‘for cause’ will in practice be forced to rebut a
showing by the Board’s General Counsel that anti-union animus
played some role in the decision.214 If the employer is unable to point
to a distinct reason, it cannot meet this burden. A showing of
disloyalty is important, but in the sense that it shows what the
employee was not fired for.215
E.

The Board’s Test Must Respond to the Concerns of the Jefferson
Standard Court

The Board is therefore free to discard the unworkable second
prong of the Mountain Shadows test, which asks whether conduct is
“so disloyal as to lose the protection of the Act,” when assessing the
protected status of public appeals for support in a labor dispute.
Nevertheless, the Board must formulate a test for the “connection”
prong that responds to the concerns of Congress, as interpreted by
Jefferson Standard, in enacting section 7 and section 10(c). The
Jefferson Standard Court cited Jones & Laughlin’s warning that the
Board must not “make its authority a pretext for interference with the
right of discharge.”216 And in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB,217 the Court quoted legislative history explaining that
section 10(c) was “intended to put an end to the belief, now widely
held and certainly justified by the Board’s decisions, that engaging in
union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the
plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in
incivilities and other disorders and misconduct.”218 If, then, the
purpose of 10(c) is to prevent wrongdoers sheltering under the
protection afforded legitimate concerted activity, it seems unlikely
that an easily-evaded requirement that an appeal indicate on its face
some connection to the dispute will suffice. What is needed is a

214. Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (“First, we shall require that
the [Board’s] General Counsel make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the
inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s decision.
Once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the
same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.”).
The Supreme Court approved the Board’s approach in NLRB v. Transport. Mgmt.
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983).
215. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 14, at 89 (“To demonstrate the illegal basis
of her termination, an employee effectively needs to disprove any number of possible
at-will reasons suggested by the employer.”).
216. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 474 (1953).
217. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
218. Id. at 217 n.11 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 42 (1947)).
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robust, relation-based test to distinguish protected concerted activity
from a “separable” attack.
A better approach to third party appeals would consider the
connection between the subject-matter of the criticism and that of the
labor dispute.219 If the criticism would be nullified by successful
resolution of the dispute, the NLRB should consider it protected. If
not, the criticism would be deemed separable from the dispute, and
thus beyond the reach of the Board’s remedial powers. Put another
way, the Board could consider the connection between the dispute
and the public interest appealed to, asking if the latter would be
addressed should the employees prevail in the dispute.
To illustrate the proposed approach, consider MikLin and
DirecTV.220 In both cases, the outcome would be reversed. In
MikLin, the labor dispute was about sick days, and the criticism
concerned the dangers posed by the employer’s sick day policy.
Success in the dispute would immediately further the public interest
in uncontaminated sandwiches. The criticism attacked a labor policy
of the company that was the subject of an ongoing labor dispute, and
the employees had already raised their grievances with management
itself. By any measure, this communication was sufficiently related to
the dispute to be considered as a part of it. Hence, the sick day poster
campaign was protected “concerted activit[y] . . . for mutual aid or
protection,”221 no matter how great—indeed, in proportion to—its
economic threat to the employer.
DirecTV is a more difficult case. At least some of the employees’
comments, however, should be considered separable from the labor
dispute.
Their only connection to the controversy was the
technicians’ goal that “by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack
might extract from the company some future concession.”222 The
labor dispute was about compensation, but the criticism concerned
the company’s sales practices. The employees hoped to exact higher
wages, but the public interest appealed to was an interest in honest
salesmen. The employees could claim a causal connection between
the compensation policy and the lies—the company told them to lie to
219. Judge Brown, dissenting in DirecTV, suggested the use of this approach
borrowed from another D.C. Circuit case. See DirecTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25,
58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc.
v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (“Though technically
implicating a different line of Supreme Court precedent . . . the court’s analysis
resonates in both.”).
220. See supra Sections II.A–C.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
222. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 476–77.
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do better under the disputed arrangement—and whether this should
suffice is a question for the Board. But a rule that includes every
alleged effect of a challenged labor policy would be overprotective.
The proposed approach resembles the connection inquiry that
formed part of the Sierra Publishing ‘reasonableness’ analysis,223 and
would reach the same result applied to the facts of that case. The
employees’ criticism addressed the manner in which the employer
handled the labor dispute; it was a concern the workers might
effectively have raised with management; and it would be nullified by
success in the dispute. Unlike the approach of the Ninth Circuit,
though, the proposed approach stops there. Factors such as harm to
the employer, malicious intent, or inflammatory style—each of which
may contribute to the effectiveness of other conduct expressly
protected by the Act224—would not restrict the right to engage in
concerted third-party appeals. Allowing these to count against the
employee tolerates too great a role for subjective policy preferences
and imports the prime causes of the present test’s uncertainty.
The proposed test also resembles, to some extent, the First
Circuit’s approach in Five Star Transportation Inc. v. NLRB,225 which
asks whether a criticism “appeared necessary to effectuate the
employees’ lawful aims.”226 In that case, the Board had carefully
distinguished between several letters, which “varied widely in content
and tone,”227 based upon their subject-matter. But this necessity test
raises the specter of a proportionality analysis—balancing the gain to
the employee against the harm to the employer—that does no more
work than the question it seeks to answer: is the conduct “so
disloyal . . . as to lose the protection of the act?”228 Moreover, a
requirement that employees show that less harmful (and therefore
less effective) means had failed, or were likely to fail, would be
complicated to apply and could prevent employees from taking action
at the time it would be most effective. The proposed approach
requires no such showing.

223. See supra Section II.D.2.
224. See supra Section II.E.
225. See Five Star Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 46, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2008)
(enforcing reinstatement order where bus drivers’ letters to employer’s employer
raised primarily employment related concerns because they “were reasonably
necessary to carry out their lawful aim of safeguarding their then-current
employment conditions”).
226. Id. at 54 (quoting NLRB v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 640 (1st
Cir. 1982)).
227. Id. at 49.
228. Id. at 52 (quoting Mountain Shadows, 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000)).
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A connection-based approach responds to Congress’s concerns, in
enacting section 10(c), that legitimate activities could provide cover
for collateral misconduct. At the same time, the test acknowledges
that if employees “are not permitted to address matters that are of
direct interest to third parties” in publicly criticizing their employer, “
it is unlikely that workers’ undisputed right to make third party
appeals in pursuit of better working conditions would be anything but
an empty provision.”229 Moreover, because protection is confined to
criticisms of the employer’s labor practices and their direct
consequences, the test will tend to exclude criticism of conditions for
which the employer cannot be held responsible and criticisms that
interfere with management prerogatives. Protected appeals should
work no needless commercial harm.
Some may object, arguing that the proposed approach takes no
account of whether employees are acting in good faith. Indeed, the
above account of section 10(c)’s animating concerns suggests that
good faith should really be the key inquiry. Any test that allows bad
faith actors to avoid discipline so long as they stay on-message, while
providing no protection for good faith critics who step slightly out of
line, might appear deeply flawed.
The problem with any test that hinges on good or bad faith is that it
will ultimately be a test of subjective intent. Although even the
MikLin majority recognized that subjective intent is “of course
relevant to the disloyalty inquiry,”230 Sierra Publishing noted that, in
practice, the employees’ motivation will rarely be discernible.231 And
to the extent that the tests applied in Sierra Publishing and Five Star
turned on the intent behind the workers’ criticisms, any effort to
incorporate such an inquiry into the present approach will struggle
under the same difficulties as those courts. A good faith inquiry
undermines the simplicity of the connection test and reintroduces the
potential for subjective judgments based on judges’ personal values:
bad faith is as nebulous a concept as disloyalty, and a test for the
latter that is grounded in the former will effectively be circular.232

229. Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989).
230. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821 (8th Cir. 2017).
231. Sierra Publ’g, 889 F.2d at 218 n.13 (“How much reliance to place on motive is
problematic because of the Janus-like nature of legitimate and illegitimate
intent . . . It is obvious that most concerted activity could be described in such a way
as to place it within either characterization.”).
232. In fact, “loyalty” and “faith” are synonyms. Loyalty, MERRIAM WEBSTER
THESAURUS, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/loyalty [https://perma.cc/
5MHK-HUKU].
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A Connection-Based Test Is Objective and Can Be More
Consistently Applied

The connection-based approach would clarify the law governing
third-party appeals. All parties would benefit. Employees would no
longer be responsible for monitoring factors that are hard to control
or measure, such as tone of voice, harm to the employer, or apparent
intent. For the employer, the proposed approach would operate
more predictably than one rooted in the imprecise and subjective
language of ‘disloyalty.’
Tribunals, meanwhile, will be more
comfortable with a connection or nexus-based test233—which is within
judicial competence as ‘disloyalty”’ has never been.234
Moreover, the suggested reading of Jefferson Standard views the
case as an interpretation not of section 10(c), but of section 7 only.
One benefit of this is that it does not implicate the troublesome idea
that section 10(c) adopted and imported a pre-existing duty of loyalty
under which a ‘servant’ could not injure his ‘master’s’ business
interest. This understanding of Jefferson Standard simplifies the
question of judicial deference to the Board: defining the scope of
section 7, courts agree, is for the Board in the first instance. The
Chevron analysis is therefore straightforward, no longer demanding
the gymnastics required to identify the true effect of (i) a Supreme
Court interpretation of (ii) one section (10(c)) of a federal statute that
(iii) creates an exception which necessarily also defines the scope of
another section (section 7) of the same Act.
CONCLUSION
The rise of social media has vastly amplified workers’ power to
express their views before the public and, if handled properly, can
serve as an effective means of employer-employee communication.
The potential benefits of enhanced employee voice may not be
realized if legal uncertainty, or insufficient protection, keeps workers
silent. On the other hand, overprotective rules can leave businesses

233. Judges apply connection-based tests in many areas of the law. For example, in
tort law, courts may ask whether an employee’s conduct is sufficiently related to his
duties to support an employer’s vicarious liability. Other examples include nexusbased scrutiny of the connection between a statutory scheme and the problem it is
intended to remedy (constitutional scrutiny), between multiple pieces of language
(interpretation of contracts, statutes, or the Constitution), and between a cause and
its purported effect.
234. See Ristau, supra note 187, at 920 (arguing that judges should focus on
detriment, rather than disloyalty, because they are better-equipped to handle the
more objective standard).
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exposed to harmful allegations that serve no productive purpose, and
merely sour relations further.
In determining the scope of protection afforded third party
appeals, the Board need not feel constrained by Jefferson Standard to
withhold the Act’s protection from ‘disloyal' communications. That
case should instead be understood as making clear that section 7
protects activities, not actors, and that conduct “separable” from the
labor dispute is beyond the reach of the NLRB. A requirement that
public criticism bears sufficient connection to the labor dispute would
enforce the distinction between protected and unprotected conduct
drawn by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act.
A connection-based approach is grounded in the Act’s
fundamental purpose of promoting industrial peace and economic
prosperity.
It admits of consistent application and objective
definition, unlike the elusive disloyalty standard that today confounds
all parties. Without a test that clearly separates a worker’s legitimate
public criticism from “biting the hand that feeds him,” the Act will
struggle to realize its goals and fulfill its potential.

